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Abstract: I argue that the best interpretation of the general theory of relativity 
(GTR) has need of a causal entity (i.e., the gravitational field), and causal 
structure that is not reducible to light cone structure. I suggest that this causal 
interpretation of GTR helps defeat a key premise in one of the most popular 
arguments for causal reductionism, viz., the argument from physics. 
 
“The gravitational field manifests itself in the motion of bodies.” 




Causal anti-reductionism or fundamentalism is the view that the causal relation is 
not grounded in, reduced to, or completely determined by some non-causal phenomenon 
or phenomena. Causal reductionism is the doctrine that obtaining causal relations are 
grounded in, reduced to, or completely determined by natural nomicity coupled with the 
world’s unfolding non-causal history. There are two commonly traveled direct paths to 
causal reductionism. First, one could try to demonstrate that a reductive theory of the causal 
relation is correct. The accounts of David Fair (1979) and David Lewis (1986a, c) 
constitute reductive theories. Fair (1979, p. 236) argued that causation is nothing over and 
above the transfer of momentum or energy (a conserved quantity), while Lewis maintained 
that causation reduces to counterfactual dependence or the ancestral of that relation.1 
Lewis’s complete story characterized counterfactual dependence in terms of the truth of 
particular counterfactual conditionals whose truth-conditions are strongly related to obtaining 
degreed similarity relations between possible, albeit, concrete physical worlds.2 Laws of nature 
and the overall history of the involved concrete physical worlds fix the similarity relations. 
Thus, for Lewis, causation reduces to physical history and natural laws. 
Many consider cases of symmetric overdetermination, asymmetric 
overdetermination, causation by prevention, and causation by omission to be counter-
examples to reductive theories.3  To illustrate the point by way of just two examples, 
consider the fact that Fair’s view cannot countenance instances of negative causation.4 A 
negative causal relation obtains only if, an absence or omission produces an effect. There 
appear to be actual instances of negative causation involving causation by omission. 
Problem. How can an absence transfer energy-momentum? The worry is a difficult one.5 
                                               
1  On transference theories generally, see the discussion in Dowe (2000, pp. 41-61). On 
counterfactual theories generally, see Paul (2009). 
2 See Lewis (1986a,b, c). Lewis would later revise his account (see Lewis (2004)). 
3 For more discussion of these types of cases see Paul and Hall (2013). 
4 See Clarke (2014, pp. 54-58); and Schaffer (2004) on the theme of negative causation. 
5 See the exchange between Dowe (2004) and Schaffer (2004) for a debate about the problem. 
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For a second example, suppose, as Lewis (1986a, c) maintained, that c causes e, just in 
case, e and c are distinct events, and e counterfactually depends on c or else there is step-
wise counterfactual dependence from e to c. The problem of symmetric overdetermination 
rears its head. Suppose that both c1 and c2 caused e, though each was able on their own to 
causally produce e by themselves. Add that c1 and c2 both occurred at t, and both caused e 
at a time t+1. A sufficient actual cause of e was c1, though e does not counterfactually 
depend upon c1, since had c1 failed to occur, e would have still occurred because c2 would 
have guaranteed such a fact. Thus, causation and counterfactual dependence come apart 
and Lewis’s (1986a, c) theory fails.6  
In spite of such problems, however, reductionists can remain steadfast in their 
adherence to causal reductionism, for there is a second independent path to that position 
which travels by way of the argument from physics (unstarred propositions (1)-(3), 
discussed in sect. 2.1 below). I believe this argument to be unsound, and I support my 
judgment by arguing that the formalism of GTR ought to be interpreted causally. I suggest 
that Albert Einstein affirmed a similar interpretation, and (so far as I’m aware) no one has 
mounted a sustained anti-reductionist defense (that does not require dispositions, or 
capacities, or causal powers) of what I consider to be the Einsteinian view, despite the fact 
that the literature is replete with objections to injecting causation into the descriptions and 
explanations GTR affords. I hope to remedy the situation by defending Einstein (or my 
interpretation of him), and by responding to many of the philosophical objections.  
 
 0.1 The Roadmap 
 
Here is my roadmap. First, I formulate the main thesis of the paper in sect. 1. I  
formulate the argument from physics, and explain how best to defeat one of its key 
premises in sect. 2. I then employ the strategies outlined in sects. 1 and 2. to argue, in sect. 
3 that what I call minimal fundamentalist causation (explained in sect. 2.3) enters the best 
interpretation of GTR. In sect. 4, I argue that standard cosmology uses domains of causal 
influence that help constitute causal pasts and causal futures. I maintain that that causal 
structure cannot be reduced to or identified with light or null-cone structure. Sect. 5 
includes my responses to objections to causal GTR (henceforth C-GTR). 
 
1. The	Argument	
In keeping with remarks previously expressed about the first path to causal 
reductionism that travels via reductive theories of causation and the independence of the 
argument from physics, I ask the reader to at least assume that, 
 
Premise 1*: All extant reductive analyses of our causal concept, and all extant 
reductive theories of the causal relation fail. 
 
                                               




Premise (1*) is generally upheld in our contemporary philosophical milieu,7 and I have 
already sampled why two reductive theories are regarded as problematic in sect. 0.  
Assuming that extant reductive theories and analyses fail does not by itself privilege 
causal fundamentalism. All contemporary reductive theories and analyses of causation 
could fail, and yet causal reductionism come out true. The latter position is not identical to 
any one reductive analysis or theory. Morevoer, that all contemporary theories fail does 
not guarantee that there will not be a future successful account.  
The strategy behind my affirmation of (1*) is simple. If your choice reductive 
theory or analysis were correct, one could always respond to any consideration in favor of 
admitting causation into any scientific theory whatsoever by reductively analyzing away 
the involved causal notions or causal structure. I therefore ask the reductionist to check 
their reductive analyses and theories at the door. The question is whether or not they can 
justify causal reductionism by way of the argument from physics without using reductive 
theories or analyses. The question is whether or not the argument from physics can stand 
on its own. 
 
Premise 2*: If the argument from physics is sound, then all approximately 
true physical theories require only laws of nature and physical 
history and do not have need of causation.  
 
This premise follows from the formulation of the argument from physics in sect. 2.1. 
 
Premise 3*: The general theory of relativity is an approximately true 
physical theory whose formalism requires a causal 
interpretation.  
 
In sect. 2, I show that an interpretation of the formalism of a physical theory like GTR is a 
part of the theory itself. Sects. 3 and 4 argue that the interpretation of GTR should be causal. 
I take for granted the fact that GTR is an approximately true physical theory.  
 
Premise 4*: If (1*) and (3*), then it is not the case that all approximately 
true physical theories require only laws of nature and physical 
history and do not have need of causation.  
 
If my demonstration of (3*) is successful, and there really is good justification for (1*), 
then there is an approximately true physical theory that does not require only laws of nature 
and non-causal physical history, since it does in fact have need of causation. One is not 
                                               
7 The opening page of The Oxford Handbook of Causation (OHC) suggests as much (Beebee, 
Hitchcock, and Menzies (2009, p. 1)). But see also the remarks in Carroll (2009); Paul and Hall (2013, p. 
249); Psillos (2009, p. 154); Schaffer (2007, pp. 872-874); and Tooley (1987, p. 5), inter alios. Carroll (2009, 
p. 285) notes that the OHC is filled with papers by reductionists who tell the many stories of failure. Schaffer 
(2007, pp. 872-874) pleads with his fellow reductionists to abandon the pursuit of reductively analyzing the 
causal relation. He (2016, sect. 2.1) believes that the argument from physics is what shows that causal 
reductionism is true. Douglas Kutach (2013, pp. 282-306) tries to show that there probably is no “complete 
and consistent systematization of cause-effect relations ‘out there in reality’ that correspond to our folk 
concept of causation…” (ibid., p. 282) gesturing at the well-known problems and counter-examples to unified 
theories. 
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entitled to interpret the examples of causal structure and causal phenomena in GTR in 
reductive terms, for that maneuver is precluded by the truth of (1*). If one needed the truth 
of a reductive theory of causation so as to escape objections to the argument from physics, 
it would follow that the soundness of the argument from physics is derivative in that it is 
dependent upon the success of a reductive theory or analysis of causation. But again, the 
argument from physics is supposed to be independent motivation for causal reductionism.  
 
Conclusion: Therefore, the argument from physics is unsound.  
 
The conclusion follows logically from the premises. 
 
2. On Pushing Causation out of Physics and On How to Reintroduce It 
2.1. The Argument from Physics 
 
Channeling, to some degree, Bertrand Russell (1912-1913), Jonathan Schaffer 
(2008) insisted that there is no room for causation in physical theory. Physics only has need 
of natural laws and unfolding history. He remarked: 
 
…causation disappears from sophisticated physics. What one finds instead are 
differential equations (mathematical formulae expressing laws of temporal 
evolution). These equations make no mention of causation. Of course, 
scientists may continue to speak in causal terms when popularizing their 
results, but the results themselves—the serious business of science—are 
generated independently.8 
 
Considerations such as those in the quoted pericope above quite naturally yield the 
following argument for causal reductionism: 
 
(1) If all approximately true physical theories require only laws of nature and 
physical history and do not have need of causation, then causal 
reductionism is true. 
(2) All approximately true physical theories require only laws of nature and 
physical history and do not have need of causation. 
(3) Therefore, causal reductionism is true.9 
This is the argument from physics.  
Efforts that consist of justifying premises (1) and (2) are efforts to justify causal 
reductionism by pushing causation out of physics. I will now turn to the recommendation 
                                               
8 Schaffer (2008, p. 92). See also Hall (2011, p. 97); and Hitchcock (2007). 
9 Schaffer (2008, p. 92). The argument Schaffer develops is explicitly one for causal reductionism 
and not causal eliminativism (cf. ibid., pp. 82-83; p. 86; p. 92). Causal eliminativism is the view that there 
are no obtaining causal relations (see Russell (1912-1913)). 
 Schaffer’s original argument appealed to scientific practice in general. It is clear, however, that he 
privileges physics as that science which puts us in touch with the fundamental. Thus, if physics has no need 
of causation, causal reductionism is well evidenced.  
For other arguments in favor of causal reductionism, see Norton (2007a), (2007b). Cf. the recent 
critical discussion in Frisch (2014, pp. 1-21). 
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of a strategy on how to avoid premise (2) by reintroducing causation into successful 
physical inquiry. 
 
2.2. How to Defeat the Argument from Physics 
 
If one assumed that causation is absent from the formalism of a physical theory T, 
one may still be forced to interpret that formalism causally. As Nancy Cartwright noted in 
her response to Bas van Fraassen (1989), 
 
The scientific image of nature is no more devoid of cause and causings than is 
our everyday experience. The appearance to the contrary arises from looking 
only at science’s abstract statements of law, and not how those are used to 
describe the world.10 
 
A predominant way of understanding the structure of T involves demarcating 
between its formalism and its interpretation.11 The formalism of T includes mathematical 
results of the kind with which Schaffer was concerned. In addition, principle-based theories 
(e.g., some formulations of thermodynamics, and special and general relativity) include in 
their formalisms underlying principles. Some of these principles are not expressed in a 
mathematical language at all. A good example of this would be the law of inertia in 
Newtonian point-mass mechanics of neither the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian, nor axiomatic 
variety.12  
An interpretation of T is a part of T that specifies how its formalism describes the 
world (Cartwright (1993, p. 426)). An interpretation of T’s formalism will employ T’s 
primitive ideology, or those notions that are indispensable to that interpretation (e.g., the 
notion of a force in Newtonian mechanics, or energy in classical Lagrangian mechanics, or 
                                               
10 Cartwright (1993, p. 426). 
11  See Craig (2008, p. 11). Though Frisch (2005, p. 3) does not affirm that the 
formalism/interpretation distinction is a part of the correct view of theory structure, he calls something like 
the view I defend the “standard conception”. 
I will be applying the standard conception to general relativity, but in so doing I do not mean to 
enter the debate between Curiel (2009)—who argues that GTR does not need an interpretation—on one side, 
and Belot (1996); and Rovelli (1999)—who argue that GTR does require an interpretation—on the other. 
This is because the conception of interpretation in that debate is much broader than what is intended in the 
present study.  
The notion of physical interpretation (the standard conception) I have in mind is closer to Curiel’s 
(2009, p. 46) idea of a categorical interpretation, and it seems almost obvious to me that GTR sits in need of 
an interpretation in that sense. Indeed, Curiel himself remarked, “…all physical theories have known 
interpretative problems of the categorical sort…” Curiel (2009, p. 47) emphasis in the original. 
My approach to physical interpretations is completely consistent with both the syntactical and 
semantic views of scientific theory structure. For the syntactic view I have in mind, see Carnap (1967); 
Hempel (1965, pp. 173-226); and the critical discussion in Suppe (1989, pp. 38-77). Sometimes the syntactic 
view is called “the received view”. On the semantic view, see Giere (1988); Suppe (1989); van Fraassen 
(1970), van Fraassen (1991, pp. 4-8); van Fraassen (2008, pp. 309-311). 12	The claim that the law of inertia is just F = ma for the special case in which F = 0 is demonstrably 
false. The law of inertia is required to define the entity relative to which the second law holds, viz., an inertial 
frame (cf. Brown’s similar point in his (2005)).	
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gravitational field in GTR).13 An interpretation will also make explicit use of the ontology 
of T. The ontology of T is that list of entities (including structures, processes, properties, 
and relations) that are required in order to properly connect—by way of a representation 
relation—the formalism of T to some proper or improper part of the world (or some suitable 
possible world). The ontology of T will also include entities that are indispensable to the 
direct metaphysical explanation of the truth of the interpreted fundamental laws of T. One 
popular way to think about metaphysical explanation is in terms of truth-making, where a 
truthmaker M, makes some proposition true, by de re necessitating its truth. That is to say, 
M’s existence necessitates the truth of the relevant proposition in some non-de dicto 
fashion. The idea is that T’s ontology includes those entities that, in a direct sense (truth-
making may be transitive) make true its fundamental laws.  
All of the above breeds a somewhat narrow conception of theories in that different 
interpretations of the same formalism produce different physical theories. But even after 
taking on board the narrow conception, one can speak loosely of the general theory of 
relativity, or non-relativistic quantum theory. A more general use of such locutions may 
serve historical or pedagogical purposes. In other words, one might, via the locution 
‘general theory of relativity’ intend to pick out that thing which Einstein promulgated in 
1915, or a class of theories that predict and explain virtually all of the same phenomena 
(e.g., Einstein’s GTR and the ADM-formulation of 1962).14 These theories* (broad uses 
of the term will now include asterisks) involve formalisms and partial interpretations of 
those formalisms. Regarding partial interpretations, Laura Ruetsche wrote, 
 
…the vast majority of the theories philosophers talk about are already partially 
interpreted. Otherwise they wouldn’t be theories of physics. These theories 
typically come under philosophical scrutiny already having been equipped, by 
tradition and by lore, with an interpretive core almost universally 
acknowledged as uncontroversial.15 
 
The current project will assume a partial interpretation of GTR* which affirms that 
the Lorentz metric (i.e., the Lorentzian metric tensor gab) represents the gravitational 
                                               
13 Following some related ideas on ideologies of theories in Quine (1951, pp. 14-15); Post (1987); 
and Hellman and Thompson (1977). 
14 See Arnowitt, Deser, and Misner (2008) for the republication of the original 1962 paper. 
15 Ruetsche (2011, p. 7) emphasis in the original. Saunders remarked similarly, “…we may read off 
the predicates of an interpretation from the mathematics of a theory, and, because theories are born 




field.16 This seems to be the standard view in contemporary relativity physics,17 and one 
could make the case that Einstein’s view was close enough to it.18 I will also assume that 
the gravitational field reduces to spacetime geometry. That reduction is also fairly standard 
in the relativity physics literature.19  Thus, if the gravitational field is a causal entity, 
spacetime geometry should be understood as causally efficacious. As the Class of Physics 
of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences put it, “[t]he new insight [of GTR] was that 
gravity is really geometric in nature and that the curving of space and time, spacetime, 
makes bodies move as if they were affected by a force.”20 
Completing the partial interpretation of GTR* should involve at least the additional 
claims that the energy-momentum tensor describes matter fields, and that solutions to 
Einstein’s field equations afford a description of matter, energy, and spacetime geometry.21 
And so, Einstein and others working in the domain of relativity physics already associated 
certain interpretive postulates and principles with the relevant formalism. That received 
“interpretive core” is a part of the extension of more general uses of the locution ‘general 
theory of relativity’. When teaching relativity physics, references to GTR* are often meant 
to pick out the formalism and accompanying partial interpretation in the early pioneering 
and contemporary work. 
Some may insist that physical theories are in no need of an interpretation because 
their underlying formalisms are in some way already fully interpreted. But this is not the 
case. In the context of GTR studies, Carlo Rovelli (1997, pp. 192-195) and Harvey Brown 
(2005, pp. 159-160; and 2009) argue that the gravitational field is very much akin to a 
                                               
16  That close association has been challenged in the philosophy of physics literature (see the 
discussion of the debate in Lehmkuhl (2008); and Rey (2013) and the literature cited therein). 
While the view I adopt is similar to Lehmkuhl’s (2008, p. 97) “Candidate 3: the metric—and all that 
it determines”, I believe considerations in Lehmkuhl’s excellent essay underwrite an inference to the best 
explanation argument for my assumed partial interpretation. That argument lurks behind the fact that almost 
all of the mathematical objects in the formalism of GTR thought to describe gravitation derive from the 
metric tensor. In this sense, their geometric and gravitational significance is parasitic on the geometric and 
gravitational significance of that sole fundamental tensor in the theory. 
17 See Norton (1989, p. 40) who said that “[i]f we are to call any structure ‘gravitational field’ in 
relativity theory, then it should be the metric.” (ibid.); Rindler (2006, p. 179); Rovelli (1997, p. 194); Cf. 
Torretti (1983, pp. 245-246).	18	Rovelli’s (2004, pp. 33-34) remarks assume that the above partial interpretation is a part of 
Einstein’s metrical approach to GTR studies even if that’s not the case in quantum gravity studies. Norton 
(1989, p. 40) says that Einstein “calls the metric tensor the gravitational field.” See Einstein (1949, p. 685); 
Einstein (1952, p. 144); Einstein’s (2002, p. 33).	
19 Carroll (2004, p. 50); Choquet-Bruhat (2009, p. 39); Geroch (2013, p. 65); Hartle (2003, p. 13) 
says “…the central idea of general relativity is that gravity arises from the curvature of spacetime—the four-
dimensional union of space and time. Gravity is geometry.” (ibid.) emphasis in the original; Wald (1984, p. 
9, cf. p. 68). Weinberg (1972, p. vii) clearly suggests that both (a) the geometrization of gravitation and (b) 
that the metric tensor represents the gravitational field are standard views (though he seems dissatisfied with 
at least (a)). Weinberg would go on to say that Einstein adhered to both (a) and (b). See also Rovelli (2004, 
p. 77). Cf. Lehmkuhl (2014) for a different perspective. 
20 Class for Physics of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2011, p. 2). 
21 I’m leaning slightly on Ruetsche (2011, p. 7). I do not whole-heartedly agree with her way of 
explicating a partial interpretation of GTR* for she injects into the partial interpretation axiomatic formalism 
(e.g., she explicitly includes Einstein’s field equations in GTR’s* partial interpretation). For me, the equations 
are the things being partially interpreted. They are not themselves the substantive content of the (partial) 
interpretation. 
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matter field (like the electromagnetic field), and that gravitational effects are due to that 
matter-like22 field’s influence.23 That view of the gravitational field is incompatible with 
the orthodox interpretation that reduces the gravitational field to spacetime geometry itself 
(q.v., n. 19). For Rovelli and Brown, spacetime does not exist as an independent substance. 
Thus, substantive interpretive debates enter GTR studies. How one should understand the 
entities that evolve in accordance with the dynamical formalism is far from obvious.  
Return now to the question under consideration: How does one demonstrate that a 
physical theory like GTR requires causation? Answer: Show that the causal relation is an 
nonexcludable member of that theory’s ontology. Evidence for the thesis that the causal 
relation is essential to GTR’s ontology can issue forth from the fact that the notion of 
causation shows up indispensably in the best interpretation (its primitive ideology) of the 
underlying formalism of that theory. Causal GTR (C-GTR) just is a formulation of general 
relativity whose interpretation entails that GTR’s ontology includes (indispensably) the 
causal relation. But what do I mean by causation? What is the causal relation that I believe 
is indispensable to GTR like? I will now sketch a general characterization of the type of 
causation that I believe best suits causal phenomena generally, but general relativistic 
effects particularly. 
 
2.3. Which Causation?: The Minimal Fundamentalist Account 
 
Since we are suppressing, for the purposes of deliberation, the truth of extant 
reductive analyses and theories of causation, the type of causation at the heart of C-GTR 
is not a relation that is reducible to counterfactual dependence, probabilistic dependence, 
the transfer of energy or momentum, or some other reductive surrogate relation or process. 
Rather, if C-GTR is the best interpretation of GTR’s formalism, there will exist in the 
primitive ideology (the indispensable notions of the ideology) of the theory, a causal notion 
that refers to a causal relation. That causal relation will be a constituent in the metaphysical 
explanation of the truth of the interpretation. It will likewise (formally) be necessarily 
multigrade, asymmetric (though not always temporally asymmetric), transitive, and 
irreflexive.  
Events understood as contingent states of substances exemplifying (joint-carving 
or scientifically respectable) properties or standing in (joint-carving or scientifically 
respectable) relations at ontological indices (understood as spacetime locations, or world 
indices) are the proper relata of causation. Moreover, causation is a dependence relation. 
When event x causes event y, y depends for its existence and contingent content on x. Event 
y’s contingent content consists of the contingent nexus of exemplification connecting the 
substance-constituent of y with the properties it exemplifies at the relevant ontological 
index. If the substance constituent of y is s, and we want to know why s has Fness at 
spacetime location L, we can respond with a report on that which caused y, viz., x (given 
that x satisfies conditions of causal relevance for which see the plausible account of 
Woodward (2003, pp. 187-238, pp. 351-353)). It is event x’s occurrence that is causally 
responsible for y’s occurring and for y’s having the contingent content it does (s’s 
                                               22	It is common in general relativity to call electromagnetic radiation a type of matter, though that 
is not the standard practice in particle physics (Rovelli (1997, p. 219. n. 10)).	
23 Brown (2005, pp. 159-160) seems to be approvingly quoting Rovelli (1997, p. 193), hence my 
connecting Brown to a view about the gravitational field (as opposed to merely the metric	field).	
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exemplifying Fness) at the relevant index. Of course, not all causes are causally relevant, 
but I articulate a case that assumes x is relevant so as to highlight the fact that causation, as 
I am understanding it, hooks up with causal explanation. Moreover, minimal 
fundamentalist causation is consistent with multifarious theories of causal explanation 
(e.g., Strevens (2008); and Woodward (2003)). 
Is the above a reductive theory of causation? No. The dependence in play is causal 
dependence. I therefore agree with Lewis (1986a), (2004), causation should be understood 
in terms of causal dependence. However, I resist Lewis’s additional step of reducing causal 
dependence to counterfactual dependence. And while this bare bones theory of causation 
is anti-reductionist/fundamentalist, it is not primitivist. Causal primitivism is the view that 
causation cannot be accurately described by any theory or analysis that includes entities 
(including properties and relations), or concepts that are more fundamental than causation 
itself. The dependence relation at the heart of the phenomenon is itself irreducibly causal. 
But minimal fundamentalist causation does provide some understanding of the causal 
relation in terms of something more fundamental, in so far as it seeks to cash out the nature 
of causation in terms of dependence. What we have here then is an anti-reductionist account 
of causation that can allow for primitivism about causal dependence though it precludes 
primitivism about causation. Primitivism about causation entails anti-reductionism about 
causation, although the converse does not hold (Carroll (2009, p. 281)).  
I call the above account, the minimal fundamentalist account. It is fundamentalist 
because either the involved causal dependence is irreducible and primitive, or else there is 
some further informative causal characterization of that dependence (i.e., it is not 
primitive). The latter disjunct is why the account is minimal. It is consistent with more 
detailed anti-reductionist theories. The fact that y causally depends on x (in the above sense) 
may itself be grounded in a further fact about manipuability (as in Woodward (2003, pp. 
25-93)), or a further fact about how a free agent acting so as to secure the occurrence of y 
by way of an effective strategy, would use x to bring about y (as in Menzies and Price 
(1993) these authors regard their position as a reductive one, but that is not the case since 
they use the notion of a productive agent in their account (cf. Woodward (2003)), or the 
further fact that some causal law involving a causal necessitation relation between states-
of-affair types begins to be instantiated (as in Armstrong (1997, pp. 202-219), given that 
states of substances as I understand them are Armstrongian concrete token states of affairs). 
And yet, my theory is incompatible with some powers-based approaches to causation in 
the work of Mumford and Anjum (2011, 156), and Lowe (2016). While such accounts are 
anti-reductionist, they reject the tenet that causation is a relation.  
Time and space do not permit a full exploration of the minimal fundamentalist 
account, but suffice it to say that when I affirm that C-GTR is true, that affirmation entails 
that there are instances of minimal fundamentalist causation in general relativistic effects 
explained and sometimes described by the dynamics of the theory. 
Before passing on to my case for C-GTR, I should highlight that substantiation of 
the soundness of the main argument that is (1*)-(Conclusion), does not require that I show 
that minimal fundamentalist causation is instantiated in every single general relativistic 
effect or dynamical action. Nor does it require that I show that every feature of minimal 
fundamentalist causation is transparently and expressly manifest in every general 
relativistic effect or dynamical evolution that I discuss. That burden is overly cumbersome 
for any proponent of any theory of causation in science. Rather, it is enough to provide an 
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abductive case. The best hypothesis that we can proffer about the type of relation or 
interaction that gravitation is, is the causal hypothesis (i.e., that the gravitational field is a 
causal entity). As I will show in sect. 3.2, no other relation is fit for the job 
 
3. The Gravitational Field as Cause 
3.1. Geodesic Motion in Einstein and Contemporary Physics 
 
Einstein’s general theory of relativity is based upon the strong equivalence principle 
(SEP) which states that, 
 
In any inertial Lorentz moving frame along a timelike geodesic g, all the 
nongravitational laws of physics, expressed in tensor coordinates with respect to 
that inertial moving frame, should at each point along g coincide with their 
special relativistic counterparts expressed in tensor coordinates with respect to 




In the standard interpretation, the SEP entails that the metric field structure of spacetime is 
responsible for inertial and gravitational effects. It implies that gravitation is strongly 
related to spacetime geometry. 24  Einstein’s field equations (henceforth EFEs, in 
geometrized units) detail the precise nature of the relationship,25 
 
(Eq. 4): Gab ≡ Rab – "#Rgab = 8pTab 
 
Or in SI units and more modern notation with a cosmological constant, 
 
(Eq. 4*): 𝑅%& − "# 𝑅𝑔%& + Λ𝑔%& = ,-./0 𝑇%&. 
 
GTR adds to the above formalism (perhaps, merely as theorems), geodesic equations of 
motion for free and test particles as well as various types of matter. The easiest case is the 
perfect fluid whose dynamical equation of motion just is, 
 
 (Eq. 5): ∇3𝑇34 = 0 
 
‘∇3’ is the covariant derivative operator that satisfies the usual conditions. 𝑇34 = 𝜌𝑢3𝑢4 +𝑃(𝑔34 + 𝑢3𝑢4)  gives the fluid’s energy-momentum tensor. ‘r’ represents the fluid’s 
density, ‘P’ its pressure, ‘u’ its four-velocity, and ‘𝑔34’ is the Lorentz metric representing 
the gravitational field as in (Eq. 4) (Wald (1984, p. 69)). It is uncontroversial that (Eq. 5) 
follows from (Eq. 4) (with appropriate interpretive postulates assumed), and there is an 
                                               
24 Carroll (2004, p. 50); Janssen (2012, p. 160); Norton (1989, pp. 40-41); Penrose (2005, p. 459). 
See also Einstein (2002, p. 33). 
25 See Carroll (2004, pp. 155-159) and Wald (1984, pp. 66-74) for clear expositions of the meaning 
of (Eq. 4). 
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associated general principle of geodesic motion (GP) commonly discussed in contexts like 
these. The GP says that due to gravitational influence, free massive bodies tread down 
timelike geodesics understood as the straightest possible curves of the spacetime metric.26 
Or timelike geodesics represent the possible trajectories of free massive bodies that are 
under the influence of gravitation. The language of influence is no foreign intruder. 
Physicists typically understand GP that way. Robert J.A. Lambourne wrote, 
 
In general relativity, the time-like geodesics of a spacetime represent the 
possible world-lines of massive particles falling freely under the influence of 
gravity alone. And, similarly, the null geodesics of a spacetime represent the 
possible world-lines of massless particles moving under the influence of 
gravity alone.27 
 
GP has traditionally been interpreted causally, since Einstein and others affirmed 
that how such objects find themselves in the aforementioned paths is through the 
determining causal influence of the gravitational field.28 Several experts on relativity attest 
to my reading of Einstein on the matter. Harvey Brown remarked, 
 
…Einstein assumed that all test bodies would follow the grooves or ruts of 
space-time defined by curves that are straight, or equivalently that are of 
extremal length. We have seen that during this period Einstein assigned a 
causal role to space-time structure in precisely this sense: to nudge the particles 
along such privileged ruts. This kind of action of space-time on matter was 
taken to be primitive…29 
 
Indeed, it would be difficult to explain why Einstein (2013, p. 59) used the action-
reaction principle (ARP) to defend GTR, if he did not regard spacetime as a causally 
                                               
26 Einstein (2002, p. 339). See the discussion of geodesic equations of motion in Carroll (2004, p. 
106-113); Weinberg (1972, pp. 70-73; 121-129); Zee (2013, pp. 275-279; 301-311). 		27	Lambourne (2010, p. 137). See also Foster and Nightingale (2005, p. 4); Rindler (2006, p. 178) 
who says that GTR predicts “the paths of light in [a] vacuum under the influence of gravity.”; Romero, 
Fonseca-Neto, and Pucheu (2011, p. 31).	
28  In 1916, Friedrich Kottler argued that Einstein interpreted the second term of the geodesic 
equation of motion in such a way that it described the gravitational field’s influence on massive bodies. 
Einstein would recognize this charge in Kottler’s work himself (see Einstein (1997, p. 238) I do not 
understand Einstein’s follow-up comment regarding meaninglessness. It does not cohere with what’s stated 
nor with Einstein’s general corpus.). He never corrected the causal nature of the interpretation attributed to 
him (see the interesting discussion of the relevant passages in Lehmkuhl (2014, p. 323)).  
Einstein uses quasi-causal language when interpreting the geodesic equation of motion. In Einstein 
(2002, p. 339), for example, he said the geodesic equation of motion describes “the motion of a material 
particle under the action only of inertia and gravitation” (ibid. emphasis mine). A little later in the same work 
Einstein says of the geodesic equation of motion that it expresses “the influence of inertia and gravitation 
upon the material particle.” (ibid., p. 341) emphasis mine. 
In dialog with Moritz Schlick about the nature of causation, Einstein (2006) interpreted gravitational 
phenomena causally. 
29 Brown (2005, p. 161). Brown would go on to reject the causal interpretation however. See also 
Brown and Lehmkuhl (2013, p. 2); Hoefer (2009, pp. 701-702); Pooley (2013, p. 541). Einstein appeared to 
be both a realist and anti-reductionist about causation (see Ben-Menahem’s (1993) discussion). 
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efficacious entity. For the ARP says that “a substance is the seat of actions on other 
substances, and in turn subject to the actions of these other substances…”30 The application 
of that principle in this context would not make sense if gravitation were not a causal 
interaction. 
Arguably, one can derive the geodesic equations of motion for massive particles 
from the EFEs (given certain interpretational postulates).31 Causal interpretations of the 
relevant formalism may therefore be unproblematic for the reductionist, for they can 
greatly mitigate the evidential importance of those interpretations for the causal 
reductionism vs. causal anti-reductionism debate by insisting that the theoremhood of those 
equations/laws suggests that even given a causal interpretation, the involved causal 
phenomena are not fundamental to GTR or GTR*. 
Notwithstanding the easy case of the perfect fluid discussed above, I worry about 
the relevance and plausibility of many of the derivations for free massive particles in the 
real world.32 Many of them assume an overly idealized or implausible picture of particles. 
Einstein and Grommer (1927) rejected attempts to derive the equations of motion from the 
EFEs that appealed to an energy-momentum tensor field Tab description of matter.33 To 
help with attempts at deriving the geodesic equations of motion, they chose to describe 
matter in terms of singularities. That characterization breeds rather absurd consequences, 
since on it, geodesics of massive bodies do not reside in space-time (Earman (1995, pp. 12-
13); Tamir (2012, p. 138 n. 2)).34 Other ways of understanding matter in the relevant 
equations exist, as do other types of attempted proofs that help one skirt around some of 
the issues. There are, however, potential problems with these alternative approaches (q.v., 
n. 32). In fact, the problem of articulating exact solutions for two gravitating masses is 
particularly disturbing. So much so that in 1989 Peter Havas could write, 
 
No…exact solutions can be hoped for in the case of two or more bodies of 
comparable masses interacting gravitationally…the only exact result to date is a 
negative one, Weyl’s proof of the nonexistence of a static two-body solution.35 
 
                                               
30 Brown and and Lehmkuhl (2013, p. 3).  
31 See Eddington (2014, pp. 125-127; cf. pp. 149-170); Einstein and Grommer (1927); Einstein, 
Infeld, and Hoffmann (1938); Einstein and Infeld (1940); Einstein and Infeld (1949); Fock (1959, pp. 215-
218); Geroch and Jang (1975); Infeld and Schild (1949). The history of attempts to derive the law of motion 
for particles from the EFEs receives careful attention in Havas (1989); and Havas (1993).  32	For worries about the success and importance of such derivations see Ehlers (1987, pp. 63-65); 
Tavakol and Zalaletdinov (1998, pp. 312-314, p. 323, p. 325); Tamir (2012).	
33 See Einstein (1954, p. 311), and the excerpts from Einstein and Grommer quoted in Havas (1989, 
pp. 240-241), and Tamir (2012, p. 141). 
34 Einstein admits in a letter to Ludwik Silberstein that “a really complete theory would exist only 
if the ‘matter’ could be represented in it by fields and without singularities.” As quoted in Havas (1993, p. 
102) emphasis in the original 
35 Havas (1989, p. 254). Cf. Torretti (1983, p. 177) who says,  
 
“While an exact general solution to the problem of motion in General Relativity is not yet 
known and may even be impossible, many authors have dealt with it by approximation 




Suppose there were exact solutions and uncontroversial derivations of the geodesic 
equations of motion for real particles. What interesting conclusions could we draw? The 
reductionist could follow Harvey Brown (2005, pp. 161-163). He maintains that 
plausibility arguments like those in Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, p. 471-480, 
henceforth MTW) recommend that the geodesic equations of motion are not axiomatic, 
and that therefore the geodesic principle should not be understood in causal terms.36 I have 
two responses to Brown’s reasoning.  
First, if there are successful derivations they would connect field equations with 
particle behavior. That is initially bizarre. Puzzlement is removed through an appreciation 
of what the entailment and geodesic equations say. They are not directly and solely about 
the motions of particles. Rather, one gains insight into the dynamical behavior of the 
particles (quoting MTW) “by looking at the geometry outside the object[s]. That geometry 
provides all the handle one needs to follow the motion[s].”37 The motions are affected by 
spacetime geometry, by the behavior of the gravitational field because matter “and the 
metric are tied together by Einstein’s equation”.38 Gravitational interaction determines 
geodesic motion. Moreover, departure from geodesics can arise because of features of 
spacetime geometry. Or, to put it another way, “anomalies in the motion go hand in hand 
with anomalies in the geometry.” 39  These facts only highlight and emphasize the 
interactive connection between field and particle motion.40 In other words, even if one can 
derive (exactly) the geodesic equations of motion from the EFEs, it is still unclear how 
precisely the gravitational field couples with matter fields, and it is unclear how the 
gravitational field influences particles in that the ontology of such coupling and influence 
is open to interpretation or metaphysical explanation.41  
Brown’s reliance on MTW is, from my standpoint, fortuitous. MTW (1973, pp. 
476-477) use causal locutions to interpret the geodesic equations of motion (e.g., “zone of 
influence” (p. 477)). This supports my contention that, theorem or not, the correct 
interpretation of the relevant dynamical interaction is causal. The relation that is the 
interaction between gravitational field and matter fields has a causal ontology. That 
interpretation is not threatened by recognition of theoremhood. My complete case for this 
reading is given in sect. 3.2. 
Let me put the two ideas I’m suggesting more explicitly. First, even if the geodesic 
equations of motion are theorems and not axioms, they both ordinarily are and ought (again 
see sect. 3.2) to be interpreted causally. If correct, that suggestion is by itself enough to 
defeat the second premise of the argument from physics. Second, the would-be fact that 
                                               
36 “The fact that geodesic motion is a theorem and not a postulate has striking consequences that 
cannot be overemphasized. Earlier…I argued that it (and the need for corrections in the case of bodies with 
spin) casts doubt on the widespread view that space-time structure, in and of itself, can act directly on test 
bodies.” Brown (2005, p. 162) 
37 Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, p. 476). 
38 Geroch and Horowitz (1979, p. 212). In the perfect fluid case one clearly sees this in the presence 
of the Lorentz metric tensor in the energy-momentum tensor of the perfect fluid. Rovelli goes further: “…in 
all physical equations one now sees the direct influence of the gravitational field…any measurement of 
length, area or volume is, in reality, a measurement of features of the gravitational field”. Rovelli (1999, p. 
7) 
39 Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, p. 476). 
40 See also Nerlich (1976, p. 264). 
41 The coupling talk is particularly relevant for Lagrangian formulations of GTR, which Einstein 
began to take hold of in 1918. 
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the geodesic equations of motion are theorems derived from the EFEs is itself a 
mathematical fact in need of interpretation. The relevant implication relation suggests an 
interaction between the dynamical behavior of fields and that of particles. Assenting to the 
orthodox partial interpretation already outlined above (see sect. 2) allows one to take hold 
of a dictum that provides a greatly unified and coherent interpretation of GP (at least in 
part): 
 
(The GP Dictum for Massive Bodies): Necessarily(natural), the gravitational field 
understood as spacetime curvature causally generates the inertial and time-like 
geodesic motion of free massive bodies. 
 
It is the truth of (The GP Dictum) that I believe explains the truth of MTW’s assertions 
about spacetime geometry and free massive particle motion. 
Second, I disagree with Brown’s implicit (2005, p. 161 note the inclusion of “during 
this period” in his comments on Einstein in ibid.) historical point that Einstein gave up on 
the causal interpretation once he could derive a geodesic principle from the vacuum EFEs 
in 1927 (see Einstein and Grommer (1927)). Einstein continued to affirm a causal 
interpretation of both GP and classical physics more generally. For example, one sees in 
Einstein’s discussion of the relationship between quantum and classical theory in his 
(1929) essay in Forschungen und Fortschritte a clear commitment to causal structure in 
the natural world that is described by classical physics, and that will be further revealed by 
a complete unified field theory. Einstein remarked, 
 
Natural phenomena seem to be determined to such an extent that not only the 
temporal sequence but also the initial state is fixed to a large extent by law. It 
seemed to me that I should express this idea by searching for overdetermined 
systems of differential equations….I strongly believe that we will not end up 
with a Subkausalität but that, in the indicated sense, we will arrive at an 
Überkausalität .42 
 
Pais translates ‘Überkausalität’, “supercausality”. Einstein’s 1929 discussion presupposed 
a causal understanding of classical physics (see the discussion in Pais (1982, pp. 464-465); 
Pais (1991, pp. 230-231); cf. the comments on Einstein and causation in quantum physics 
in Weinert (2005, p. 96)).  
Like Einstein, contemporary relativity scholars have not refrained from causally 
interpreting the action of the gravitational field even after many attempted derivations and 
plausibility arguments were published. When discussing how precisely to interpret the GP 
given issues about the argument from physics and causal reductionism in the background, 
                                               
42 As quoted and translated by Pais (1982, p. 465). With respect to Einstein and the ultimate unified 
field theory, Pais (ibid.) goes on to remark, “He [Einstein] demanded that the theory shall be strictly causal, 
that it shall unify gravitation and electromagnetism, that the particles of physics shall emerge as special 
solutions of the general field equations…” emphasis mine 




Robert Wald remarked that generally, “[t]he metric and matter fields are coupled and 
undergo causal interactions”, and both metric and matter “influence each other causally”.43 
Brown may have been assuming that what is fundamental to a physical theory is 
that which can be closely read off of the axiomatic formalism of that theory (in this case, 
the EFEs). But if one goes in for such a view of fundamentality and physical theorizing it 
ought to be essential to one’s understanding of what’s fundamental to that theory that 
everything that is derivative fall out of true descriptions of the world’s fundamental 
structure according to those axiomatic equations and their solutions. God needed only to 
ensure that a general relativistic spacetime satisfied general relativistic axiomatic equations 
and/or their solutions, and that certain initial conditions obtained. All other relativistic 
structure falls out by consequence of the creation of both fundamental structure and initial 
conditions. This view of the structure of a physical theory does not suit GTR well even 
though there exists a well-posed initial value formulation of the theory (see Wald (1984, 
pp. 243-267)).44 The geodesic equations of motion for a free particle follow from the EFEs 
only if certain interpretational postulates are assumed to hold (see on this Malament (2009); 
and Malament (2012b)). For example, the distributional proofs of the geodesic equation 
use Einstein’s generalized EFEs (Tamir (2012, 144); Infeld (1954); Infeld (1957)). 
However, the conservation principle ∇3𝑇34 = 0 does not follow from those equations, 
since the Bianchi identities are not true for all solutions to a generalized form of the EFEs 
since those equations use distributional tensors (Tamir (2012, pp. 143-144) referring 
explicitly to energy-momentum tensor distributions). However, local energy-momentum 
conservation is an extremely important principle that does powerful explanatory work in 
GTR. One must assume it in the context of distributional proofs and even then, there are 
problems to overcome.  
Add that the famous limit operation proof of Geroch and Jang (1975) must use an 
interpretive postulate in the antecedent of the theorem. As originally stated, the theorem 
did not use what’s called the weak energy condition (i.e., that the energy density of the 
relevant matter fields is non-negative). 45  But rather, it made use of (though perhaps 
inessentially (see the discussion of this in Weatherall (2011)) the strengthened dominant 
energy condition (though Geroch and Jang called it “the (strong) energy condition” (1975, 
p. 66)). That condition subsumes the weak energy condition, but adds that the four-
momentum density of the relevant matter fields is a vector that is both timelike and future-
directed (cf. Malament (2012a, 144, or more technically “[g]iven any timelike vector 𝜉𝑎,	at 
any point in M, 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝜉𝑎𝜉𝑏 ≥ 0 and, if 𝑇𝑎𝑏 ≠ 𝟎	there, then	𝑇𝑏𝑎𝜉𝑏 is timelike” (ibid.)). 
                                               
43 Robert Wald (personal correspondence, 12/18/2014). See also Geroch (1978, p. 180); Geroch 
(2013, p. 2, p. 65, p. 68); cf. Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, pp. 476-477); Nerlich (1994), though not 
clearly committed to a causal interpretation of spacetime’s action says, “[b]ut GR surely makes spacetime 
something not easily distinguished from a real concrete entity with causal powers” (ibid., p. 183). And Carl 
Hoefer (2009, p. 702) says the causal interpretation is commonly accepted. Brown describes the position that 
spacetime in GTR acts as a view that is “widespread” (Brown (2005, p. 162)). So far as I’m aware, neither 
Hoefer nor Brown endorse the causal interpretation I’m defending. 
44 I’m ignoring the problem of specifying “choice” coordinates or a gauge. 
45 More technically, for every timelike vector 𝜉µ  associated with any point in the differentiable 
manifold representing spacetime the following relation holds: 𝑇%&𝜉%𝜉& ≥ 0. It is assumed that the energy-
momentum tensor is appropriately related to the matter fields a hypothetical observer gives attention to.  See 
the discussion in Malament (2009, pp. 6-7); Malament (2012a, p. 144); and Weatherall (2011). 
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 These energy conditions amount to restrictions on the energy-momentum tensor in 
the EFEs that do not follow from the EFEs themselves (see the comments of Curiel (2014, 
p. 41)). They are therefore interpretational postulates not part of the axiomatic equations. 
They are used to help one understand the nature of the objects described by the axiomatic 
formalism of GTR. 
Perhaps one could incorporate the relevant postulates into the theory as axioms? 
There are many reasons why that is implausible. Here are two among many. First, it 
unnecessarily restricts the domain of nomologically possible relativistic spacetimes to 
those that are described by EFEs with an energy-momentum tensor that satisfies the 
relevant promoted energy conditions. Second, the energy-momentum tensor depends on, 
inter alia, the metric gab. 46  One cannot specify the distribution of matter without 
determining the metric. The two are intimately related, and one must account for that 
relationship when seeking to interpret and solve for Tab (q.v. sect. 5.3 below).47 But as I’ve 
suggested above and as I will attempt to conclusively argue below, the entity represented 
by gab is a causal entity, relating causally to matter distribution. That is the best account. 
Let me fuel this idea some. 
 
3.2. The Interaction Must be Causal: Closing the Argumentative Loophole 
 
In preceding discussion, I argued that Einstein and a great many relativity scholars 
interpret the geodesic principle causally. I have likewise argued that that interpretation is 
not defeated by the mere fact that geodesic equations of motion can be derived from the 
EFEs. The existence of a derivation of the geodesic equations of motion from the EFEs 
underwrites, and does not count against, the judgment that the gravitational field interacts 
with matter fields and particles. I will now argue that the causal interpretation is the best 
interpretation. 
 
3.2.1. Interactions are in General Causal 
 
It is a datum that gravitation is an interaction. 48  Both reductionists and anti-
reductionists affirm that interactions are causal. 
In Aronson (1971, p. 421 emphasis mine) a reductive theory is defended, and there 
exists in that work a choice avenue for specifying causal phenomena in science by way of 
picking out “changes that result from interactions with other objects” (ibid.). Reductionist 
Wesley Salmon (1984, with other scholars following him, notably (Hitchcock (2004, pp. 
933-934)) constructed his theory of causation by, inter alia, distinguishing between mere 
happenings such as spatio-temporal intersections, and interactions. The latter were 
regarded as causal, and the former were judged to be non-causal. When two things were 
said to interact, (when two footballs collide in mid-air) there is causation. When, however, 
                                               
46 Geroch (2013, p. 67); Lehmkuhl (2011, pp. 470-474). 
47 As Geroch noted, “[e]verywhere, we see the metric, directly or indirectly, in the stress-energy…It 
appears that it is simply impossible to make any reasonable description of matter without the notions of space 
and time provided by the metric” Geroch (2013, p. 67). See also Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 61); Malament 
(2012a, p. 160); Pooley (2013, p. 541. n. 38). The dependence holds even for Lagrangian formulations (see 
Lehmkuhl (2011, pp. 464-470)). Why is this true? The answer lies in the interpretation of GTR on offer (see 
sect. 5.3). 
48 “Gravity is one of the four fundamental interactions.” Hartle (2003, p. 3). 
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two shadows “pass through” each other, there is mere intersection. Whatever one makes of 
Salmon’s heuristic for discerning the difference, or whatever one makes of his view of 
intersections, it’s clear that interactions were univocally regarded as causal. This dogma 
was not abandoned when Salmon shifted to a conserved quantity theory of causation.  
 Interactions can be plausibly understood as a species of token instances of 
interventions as characterized by non-reductive manipulability approaches to causation 
(for which see Pearl (2009); Spirtes, Glymour, an Scheines (2000); Woodward (2003, pp. 
98-151); and Woodward (2009, pp. 243-247) where Woodward explicitly connects total 
causation and the accompanying account of causal relevance (his condition SC) to a causal 
interpretation of Newtonian gravitation (ibid., 249)). Many members of this family of 
views typically understand interventions in terms of “bringing about”, or by way of the 
behavior of “causal mechanisms”, or as “actual, and/or direct causation”. Pearl explicates 
causal mechanisms as entities that can interact by way of disruption and interference (see 
Pearl’s remarks in (2009, pp. 225-226); Woodward (2009, pp. 243-244 has a similar 
reading). Adrian Heathcote (1989) thinks of all causal phenomena as nothing over and 
above fundamental interactions or interactive phenomena explained and described by 
quantum field theory. It is clear then that both reductionists and anti-reductionists alike 
deem interactive phenomena, causal phenomena. 
 That distinctively physical interactions are causal explains why other interactive 
theories in the history of physics are standardly outfitted with causal interpretations. For 
example, in classical Maxwellian electrodynamics, the Lorentz force law 𝐅 = 𝑞(𝐄 +𝐯	 × 	𝐁)  specifies an interactive relationship between external fields and charged particles. 
Frisch adds, “…the association between external fields and the acceleration of a charge is 
usually interpreted causally: External fields cause charges to accelerate” (Frisch (2005, p. 
30)). Moreover, the acceleration of a point charge interacts with electromagnetic fields. 
That is likewise standardly understood in causal terms (Frisch (2005, p. 30)). Our best 
theory of the strong interaction or strong force is quantum chromodynamics or QCD. That 
theory is typically interpreted in such a way that the fundamental particles of the theory 
causally interact with one another by means of undulations of quantum fields (Heathcote 
(1989, p. 100)). Indeed, gluon self-causal interaction is the basis of the theory’s asymptotic 
freedom. Examples and citations could be multiplied.  
 
3.2.2. Gravitational Interactions are Not Instances of Non-Causal Determination 
 
 Given that gravitation is an interaction, and that interactions are causal, we can 
mount a strong case for the claim that the causal interpretation of gravitational interaction 
is indeed forced upon us. We should not, for example, regard the determining influence of 
the gravitational field as mere non-causal nomological determination, where that relation 
involves one state of a physical system necessitating another in a way that is backed by 
dynamical laws (i.e., the dynamical law in question guarantees that the necessitation 
relation obtains). The “effects abstractly result from certain constellations of temporally 
prior conditions without necessarily being actively produced by them.”49 There are two 
reasons for this. First, an appeal to nomological determination begs the question. What 
                                               
49 Birnbacher and Hommen (2013, p. 144) emphasis in the original. The authors are there concerned 
with a reductionist (the laws are non-causal) account of causation whose backbone is essentially the relation 
of nomological determination.  
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ensures that the necessitation relation obtains are the backing laws, and if those laws are 
causal, they will, with a brand of necessity, guarantee that causes relate to effects. In 
contrast, the objection on offer has need of non-causal nomological determination relations, 
and so the laws in play should be non-causal dynamical laws. The backing laws in general 
relativistic cases will be the laws of GTR. And so, the question just is whether GTR’s laws 
should be interpreted causally.50  
The most substantial benefit of the causal nomological determination approach is 
that it fits more appropriately with the datum that gravitation is an interaction. If a physical 
phenomenon is interactive, then the laws that describe it should be causal. If they are not, 
then the scientific explanations of general occurrences of that phenomenon that those laws 
afford will miss out on structure and consequently fail to be complete. My approach is a 
world-first (or phenomenon-first) natural philosophical approach. We do not learn what 
the world is like by just looking at disconnected math. There would be no reason for 
deeming the math approximately correct, if it did not track goings-on in the world. In 
addition, the math was intended (by Einstein and others) to represent the world. It was 
intended to explain the perihelion of Mercury, and it was intended to explain why 
accelerating in a vacuum and “resting” in a uniform gravitational field cannot be 
discriminated by an observer on operational grounds. Phenomenon first. Math later. That 
order motivates classes of interpretations of the formalism, in this case, the causal 
interpretation of GTR. This is because the phenomenon out in the world is universally 
acknowledged as an interactive one. 
There is, of course, a debate in the philosophy of physics literature about whether 
laws of nature should in general be understood causally. I will not take up the banner of 
any one side on the more general issue. The specific case of GTR’s laws of geodesic motion 
quite clearly support causal approaches to laws of nature in general relativistic contexts. 
My judgment is supported by the fact that the leading non-causal approach to laws fails to 
adequately explain the phenomenon that is the focus of this section. Let’s see why by 
focusing on Robert DiSalle’s best-systems treatment of the phenomenon. 
 
3.2.3. A Mill-Ramsey-Lewis Best-Systems Treatment? 
 
DiSalle (1995, pp. 323-328) maintained that spacetime structure ought not be 
regarded as a cause of inertial motion. Rather, there exist non-causal laws of the geometric 
structure of spacetime which state flatly and brutely that free particles follow geodesics. 
He said, 
 
When we say that a free particle follows, while a particle experiencing a force 
deviates from, a geodesic of spacetime, we are not explaining the cause of the 
difference between the two states or explaining "relative to what" such a 
difference holds. Instead, we are giving the physical definition of a spacetime 
geodesic. To say that spacetime has the affine structure thus defined is not to 
postulate some hidden entity to explain the appearances, but rather to say that 
                                               
50 Glennan (2011, p. 811) points out that nomological determination is at home in a causal approach 
to laws of nature (mentioning the well-known causal account of David Armstrong inter alia). 
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empirical facts support a system of physical laws that incorporates such a 
definition.51 
 
DiSalle’s take on geodesic motion in relativity is comfortably situated amidst a Mill-
Ramsey-Lewis best systems account (BSA) of laws of nature.52 This is because what 
matters for DiSalle is whether the physical theory in question accounts for observations. 
Puzzlement is removed once one realizes the truth of the definition of geodesic motion and 
the fact that the system in which that definition is incorporated is sufficiently explanatorily 
powerful though not at the cost of simplicity. Recall that the BSA affirms that laws of 
nature constitute a system of propositions that best explains true empirical generalizations 
in a way that is balanced with simplicity. Ergo, DiSalle’s account seems to assume 
something like the BSA, and so the fate of that account is tied to the plausibility of the BSA 
or something near enough. This is bad. Independent problems for the BSA abound,53 and 
if that account is for reasons laying outside of GTR false, it should not be invoked here. 
 Let us set to one side the independent objections to the BSA, and ask what it is 
specifically about GTR that spells trouble for the BSA. There is an interactive-dynamical 
explanation of “the appearances” with which DiSalle is concerned. The inertial motion to 
be explained by the laws, and described by the GP, is not merely “a free particle” following 
“…a geodesic of spacetime”. Rather it is a state involving a gravitating free particle 
following a geodesic. DiSalle’s account fails because it mischaracterizes the geodesic 
principle, and geodesic motion. It is interesting that so many contemporary statements of 
the principle remove the language original to it. That language connects geodesic motion 
to the gravitational field. Einstein’s original statement of the principle (what he called the 
“law of motion”) included just such a qualification, for he said that the principle “asserts 
that a gravitating particle moves in a geodesic line.”54  Thus, DiSalle’s best-systems 
treatment of the laws about the phenomenon of geodesic motion fails to explain what is at 
issue, the interaction of field and particle. 
 
3.2.4. Other Treatments? 
 
Perhaps the relation between gravitational field and matter fields or particles is one 
of supervenience. The matter fields supervene upon the gravitational field. Of course, more 
needs to be said, as there are plenty of supervenience relations to go around (e.g., weak, 
strong, global, mereological, nomological etc.). The most natural choice in this context is 
nomological supervenience. J property instances nomologically supervene on K property 
instances, just in case, in the galaxy of naturally possible worlds, J property instances are 
nomologically necessitated by K property instances. At any world in the relevant galaxy, 
at the relevant times and locations, a distribution of K property instances (if they exist) 
ensures a distribution of J property instances at the same times and at or near the same 
locations in a manner that holds with a kind of natural nomological necessity. Or, to put it 
                                               
51 DiSalle (1995, p. 327). 
52 See Lewis (1973, pp. 72-77); Lewis (1983, pp. 365-368); Lewis (1994, pp. 478-482); and Loewer 
(2012) for clear discussions or presentations of the view. 
53 See particularly the objections in Belot (2011); Hall (2015); and Maudlin (2007). 
54 Einstein (1950, p. 109 emphasis mine). See also Geroch and Jang (1975, p. 65). 
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another way, K-facts “about a situation naturally necessitate the” J-facts.55 The idea is that 
wherever you look out and see in the actual world or (with a modal telescope) in some 
naturally possible world a certain set arrangement of K property instances you will see the 
self-same partnering arrangement of J property instances.  
Given that nomological supervenience is one’s choice relation, the objection from 
supervenience will beg the question in precisely the same way the invocation of 
nomological determination did, for as was just explicated above, the standard way to 
characterize nomological supervenience is in terms of nomological determination or 
necessitation.56  
One might forsake supervenience and instead recommend one of the other 
metaphysically significant relations such as composition, constitution, or realization. 
Unfortunately, these are, for formal reasons, the wrong relations in this context. 
Composition, for one thing, is a many-one relation. It is for that, and other obvious reasons 
disqualified. Constitution is a relation between collocated massive bodies. The 
gravitational field is not a (traditional) massive body and is not collocated with any massive 
bodies in cases involving photons (photons are massless). Realization of the kind I favor 
(see Gillett (2003)) is, like composition, a many-one relation between property-instances 
“of the parts of a whole, and the properties [or property-instances] of the whole” 
(modifying Bennett’s (2017, p. 11) summary discussion of Gillett), and that disqualifies it 
in the general relativistic context too. 
We are left with grounding. And here I help myself to Jonathan Schaffer’s (2009) 
conception. According to that view, an entity x grounds another entity y, just in case, y 
depends for its positive ontological status (its existence) and nature on x (where the 
dependence is asymmetric, transitive, and well-founded). I confess that I do not see a 
reason for distinguishing between causation and grounding in this context. For although 
Schaffer contrasts grounding priority with causal priority, musing that when x is (in the 
grounding sense) prior to y, it is not causally prior to y (Schaffer (2010, p. 345)), if that 
suggestion is interpreted as one which claims that causation and grounding can never 
coincide, the point is made in haste. Surely when (leaning on examples discussed in 
Schaffer (2000, pp. 165-166)) Merlin casts a spell that transforms a prince into a toad at t, 
he causes a new entity to come into being at t. We can say of the toad that it depends for 
its nature and positive ontological status upon Merlin’s spell casting event. It seems then 
that causal priority can coincide with grounding priority.57 Call such coincident instances 
of causation and grounding causal grounding. 
Return to the case involving the gravitational field and matter fields or particles. 
Just as in the case of Merlin and spell casting, here too I believe there is causal grounding. 
                                               
55 Chalmers (1996, p. 37) although Chalmers calls it natural supervenience. 
56 Again see the characterization in Chalmers (1996, p. 37). 
57 The Merlin case may strike one as too bizarre. Give attention then to any scenario in which 
something begins to exist on account of a preexisting cause. I, an agent, made a decision to write this paper. 
Even if agent causation reduces to event causation, and even if mental causation reduces to something non-
causal, no problems arise. A plethora of events causally produced a decision, a mental event that was not 
around before. The decision depends for its existence and nature upon the preceding physical (and perhaps 
mental) events. If causal reductionism is right, the relevant instance of mental causation reduces to something 
non-causal, though (importantly) it is not eliminated. Causal reductionism is not causal eliminativism. We 
have therefore an instance of mental causation, but also an instance of grounding irrespective of whether or 
not causal reductionism holds. 
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If the field’s properties cause a particle to have a property (change its trajectory etc.) at 
some time, then the latter event will depend for its existence and content on the former 
event as predicted by minimal fundamentalist causation. Schaffer allows for entities from 
any ontological category to stand in grounding relations. 
 
4. Domains of Causal Influence in Cosmology: Causal Pasts and Causal Futures 
 
I have argued that a proper understanding of the gravitational field in GTR implies 
that causation is indispensable to the best interpretation of GTR’s formalism. There is, 
however, another sense in which causation enters successful physics and that is by way of 
a proper understanding of the formalism of standard cosmology (which of course subsumes 
the formalism of GTR, see Weinberg (2008, pp. 1-100; pp. 511-529) for the details). 
According to standard cosmology, a relativistic spacetime is a pair (M, gab), where M is a 
manifold with four dimensions that is without boundary, and both connected and smooth. 
The Lorentz metric field gab is both non-degenerate and smooth. I will also assume that our 
spacetime is not just time-orientable, but time-oriented. 
Given the above assumptions, spacetime points induce double light cone structure. 
Generally speaking, a light cone is built from a collection of points each of which enjoys a 
type of connection to the vertex spacetime point of the cone via straight lines that could be 
traced out by the motions of photons moving away from the vertex spacetime point (leaning 
on Carroll (2004, p. 9)) if the cone were embedded in spacetime. A double light cone 
structure involves two such cones that share a vertex point. Our assumptions above allow 
us to identify one cone in such a structure as the future light cone, and the other the past 
light cone. Points in the future or past light cone are timelike separated from p, points on 
the cone are light-like separated from p, and points outside the cone are spacelike separated 
from p. 
There is some confusion about the precise nature of light cone structure in GTR. 
Some physicists use the locution ‘light cone’ to refer to a cone structure with vertex point 
p that lives in a tangent space Vp. Tangent spaces are not spacetime structures (parts of 
spacetime or representations of spacetime). Tangent spaces are collections of every tangent 
vector at some spacetime point (Lee (2009, p. 58)). Understood as a space, they are 
“isomorphic to Minkowski spacetime” (Wald (1984, p. 189)). I will call cone structures in 
spaces like Vp null cones. There is another “light cone” structure surrounding spacetime 
point p that is induced by “null geodesics from p” (Wald (1984, p. 189. n. 1)). I will call 
this latter type of structure “light cone structure”.  
Importantly, neither light cones, nor null cones can be identified with causal 
structure in GTR, where that latter type of structure is what (given our assumptions above) 
the standard cosmological model associates with spacetime points. That type of structure 
is sometimes called “domains of influence.” Future and past domains of causal influence 
are represented by the locutions ‘J+(p)’ and ‘J-(p)’, where p is a spacetime point that is a 
member of M. J+(p) represents p’s causal future, while J-(p) represents p’s causal past. J+(p) 
is that “region of space-time which can be causally affected by events in” p.58 “Physically,” 
                                               
58 Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 183) emphasis mine. 
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(quoting Robert Geroch) J-(p) “represents the collection of all events of space-time which 
can affect what happens at p.”59 
Quoting scholars who use causal locutions is, of course, not enough for my 
purposes. But appreciate the further fact that GTR does not reduce or identify domain of 
influence structure to/with null or light cone structure (e.g., Norton (2015, p. 211) denies 
such identification). First, gravitational lensing precludes the identification of causal 
structure with light cones.60 Second, null cone structure induced by vertex spacetime point 
p lives in tangent space Vp, while domains of influence J+(p), and J-(p) are both subsets of 
the manifold M itself. They are not in Vp. How can null cones be identical to causal futures 
and pasts if the two entities live in different spaces? Third, against identification of causal 
structure and light cone structure, Hawking and Ellis wrote, “…in Minkowski space, the… 
[light] cone of p forms the boundary of the causal and chronological futures of p. However, 
in more complicated space-times this is not necessarily the case (e.g. see figure 34).” 
(Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 184) emphasis mine. Figure 34 references a Minkowski 
spacetime in which a spacetime point has been removed).61 
That last point may have been too quick. What I’m arguing is that light cones are 
not identical to causal pasts/futures. If they were, they’d never come apart. Hawking and 
Ellis provide a counter-example to the claim that future light cones and causal futures are 
identical. How do they do this? They provide an example of a spacetime where the two 
come apart. That spacetime is Minkowskian, and is missing a spacetime point.  
What my argumentation shows is that relativity scholars use explicitly causal 
notions in the ideology of GTR. They give attention to questions about what can causally 
influence what when using GTR to theorize about the structure of the cosmos. It is therefore 
                                               
59  Geroch (2013, p. 123) emphasis mine. Geroch uses ‘I-(p)’ to represent p’s past domain of 
influence. I am widening Geroch’s notion of a domain of influence a bit since even he admits that the term 
can be misleading, since I-(p) (having to do with the narrower conception of a past domain of influence) 
“does not include its boundary, whereas points on the boundary can, in general, also influence p” (ibid., p. 
123). I am deliberately intending to include the boundary. In so doing, I follow Bhattacharyya, Colombo, and 
Sotiriou’s (2016, p. 17) identification of domains of influence with causal pasts and futures. Cf. Manchak 
(2013, p. 590); Ellis and Stoeger (2009). 
In this section, I am not arguing that causal structure is causally efficacious. I am not arguing that 
the specific geometric features standing behind causal structure are themselves causally efficacious. The 
argument in this section is that there’s a type of structure to spacetime that cosmology needs that is causal in 
that it is explicitly defined in causal terms. That causal taint cannot be dispensed with because that causal 
structure cannot be identified with any non-causal structure such as light or null cone structure. So the stuff 
about light/null cones and causal structure is independent of the stuff about the causal efficaciousness of the 
gravitational field/metric field or spacetime geometry previously discussed in this paper. 
60 Gravitational lensing involving matter or associated caustics can produce a collapse or folding in 
of the light cone induced by a vertex point p in the manifold (Ellis, Bassett, and Dunsby (1998, pp. 2346-
2347)); Schutz says “…even a small amount of matter in spacetime will distort light-cones enough to make 
them fold over on themselves.” (p. 336)). That folding can entail that part of the (past or future) cone bends 
inside of the causal past or future of p (Perlick (2004); Tavakol and Ellis (1999, p. 41) who include further 
references on this point). The past/future light cone and the causal past/future of p cannot therefore be 
identical. Thanks to George Ellis for help with references. 
61  The mistake of identifying causal structure in relativity with light cone structure is often 
committed by philosophers (see e.g., Frisch (2014, pp. 16-17); Field (2003, p. 436) comes close to suggesting 
such identification). Causal or influence structure is standardly regarded as more fundamental than light cone 
structure in GTR (see Geroch (2013, p. 125)). 	
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not true that all approximately true physical theories have no need of causation, relativity 
scholars need causation to carry on with the business of relativity scholarship. 
 
5. Objections to the Causal Interpretation of GTR 
 
Causation enters physics by way of the gravitational field and by way of domains 
of influence. The argument from physics is therefore unsound if the reasoning of sects 3 
and 4 is cogent. I will now fend off objections to my case for C-GTR. 
 
5.1. GTR is Not Fundamental 
 
Carl Hoefer (2009, pp. 703-704) argues that if GTR implies that there are certain 
obtaining causal relations, or if its best interpretation makes use of causal notions, the 
causal reductionist should not be worried, for GTR is not itself a fundamental physical 
theory. GTR’s picture of the world is not the quantum mechanical picture of the world. 
Perhaps, GTR will have to yield to QM in ways that would rub out any attempt to 
understand the causal activity of the gravitational field as fundamental physical activity. In 
response to this, look back to my characterization of Schaffer’s argument for causal 
reductionism. Notice that one of the premises of the argument states that physics can 
proceed without causation making use instead of natural nomicity and history solely. That 
premise is not restricted to fundamental physics. GTR is an approximately true and 
extremely successful physical theory, and that is precisely why any quantum theory of 
gravity must recover its predictive success. Thus, Hoefer’s complaint should not worry the 
fundamentalist about causation. 
It is true that both string theory and loop quantum gravity proponents maintain that 
GTR should be recoverable within the framework of such quantum theories of gravity in 
the classical limit. However, there are theories of quantum gravity (QG) that do not seek 
for such subsumption. The correct theory of QG may be one that is more fundamental than 
both QM and GTR. Lucian Hardy’s causaloid approach to quantum gravity is like this. 
According to that approach, GTR and QM are “special cases” (Hardy (2007, p. 3082)). 
Important to Hardy’s theory however is indeterminate fundamental dynamical causal 
structure.62 What is more, there are other takes on QG that promote causal structure to 
fundamental status. For example, causal set approaches to quantum gravity are approaches 
that, according to Dean Rickles, treat “the causal structure of spacetime as fundamental”.63 
Furthermore, Aron C. Wall (2013) has recently proposed an explicitly causal theory of 
quantum gravity. The correct framework for a truly quantum theory of gravity is far from 
settled. The current status of QG studies suggests that any case for the claim “fundamental 





                                               
62 Hardy (2007, pp. 3084-3085). 
63 Rickles (2008, p. 347. n. 124) emphasis mine. The quote’s immediate context is about Robb’s 
formulation of STR, but it’s clear from context that Rickles is also intending to characterize causal set 
approaches to quantum gravity. 
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5.2. Time-Reversal Invariance and Closed Timelike Curves 
 
The causal reductionist may still object: The dynamical laws of GTR are time-
reversal invariant. Therefore, any causal reading of those equations will imply the negation 
of the principle that necessarily, causes always temporally precede their effects. But surely 
that principle is true! 
The principle that necessarily, causes always temporally precede their effects is in 
fact false. Recall that in Newtonian mechanics, gravitational interactions obtain 
instantaneously, and that the gravitational field does not possess a temporal dynamics.64 
However, the Newtonian gravitational force is commonly understood as causally acting on 
objects. But if its action does not obey time-governed dynamics, and its interactions are 
instantaneous, it looks as if simultaneous causation is an implication of Newtonian 
gravitation. Of course, this response assumes a causal interpretation of Newtonian 
gravitation, but that interpretation is at least not incoherent. All I need is a possibly true 
causal interpretation of Newtonian gravitation, and that possible interpretation is Newton’s 
own. Newton said the gravitational force is a centripetal impressed force. Newton took 
impressed forces to be actions “exerted on a body to change its state either of resting or of 
moving uniformly straight forward.”65 Newton’s more general theory of impressed forces 
is closely related to the principle that every event or change is caused.66 
 In the Newtonian limit, relativity scholars deal only with small velocities and weak 
gravitation. It is there that the dynamics of the gravitational field is independent of time 
(Hawking and Ellis (1973, pp. 71-72); Zee (2013, p. 303) with Zee noting that particles 
can indeed still move (there’s dynamics involved)). It is there that massive bodies can 
produce gravitational effects in such a way that the dynamics (the gravitation) is described 
by the Poisson equation ∇2 Φ = 4πGρ to which the Einstein field equation reduces (Misner, 
Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, pp. 415-416)). That equation incorporates a Laplaciean 
operator with only spatial dimensions (no time). The gravitational (causal) action in the 
Newtonian limit, even in GTR, appears to be instantaneous though it is not at-a-distance, 
since the metric field is where the objects are (ibid., 177). 
The reductionist may go on to argue that my reading of the dynamical equations 
implies that backwards causation is possible, since there will be a general relativistic 
spacetime at which the causes are the effects, and the effects the causes. How can C-GTR 
employ minimal fundamentalist causation when that causation is asymmetric, and general 
relativistic action and influence is clearly not? 
I believe the objection is confused about the formal property of asymmetry. We say 
that the causal relation (Cxy) is asymmetric, just in case, ∎∀𝑥∀𝑦(𝐶𝑥𝑦	 ⟶ ~𝐶𝑦𝑥). In other 
words, causation is asymmetric if, and only if, necessarily for any x and for any y, x causes 
y, only if, it is not the case that y causes x. Given that x actually causes y, absolutely no 
inconsistency with asymmetry arises from the mere fact that at some other possible world, 
w, y causes x. This is because causal asymmetry is not the thesis that necessarily for any x 
and for any y, x causes y, only if, necessarily it is not the case that y causes x.  
                                               
64 Wald (1984, p. 8); Zee (2013, p. 146). 
65 Newton (1999, p. 405) italics removed. 
66 Jammer (1957, p. 121). Westfall (1971, p. 323). 
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The reductionist will continue to push by noting that GTR does not preclude 
spacetimes with closed timelike curves (CTCs) or closed causal curves (CCCs). If GTR 
holds, then spacetimes with CTCs are naturally nomologically possible. But it is well 
known that if spacetimes with CTCs are nomologically possible, then time travel is 
nomologically possible. If, however, time travel is nomologically possible, then (given the 
natural necessary falsehood of causal eliminativism) backward causation is naturally 
possible. Minimal fundamentalist causation is transitive, and asymmetric. That entails that 
it is also irreflexive. But backwards causation of the kind that involves a body acting at a 
time t, exerting an influence on itself via a causal loop that exploits the exotic causal 
structure of a spacetime violates irreflexivity (given transitivity). The action and influence 
in GTR must therefore be non-causal. 
I have a two-part response. First, the overlapping and intersecting causal paths 
provided by CTCs and CCCs are the real cause for worry, not necessarily the phenomenon 
of backward causation, for there is a defensible position on the matter of CTCs in GTR that 
preserves the metaphysical possibility of the latter peculiarity while unproblematically 
abandoning the metaphysical possibility of the former. Here is the idea: 
 
Backwards Causation without Violation of Irreflexivity: The trajectories of 
particles tracing out part of CTCs or CCCs can be near loops. One need only 
invoke a spacetime in which a spacetime point is removed, as in spacetimes that 
violate the strong causality condition (for which see Wald (1984, pp. 196-197)). 
In such a physically possible world, “there” are “no closed causal curves…but 
there are causal curves through” spacetime point p, say, “which come 
‘arbitrarily close’ to intersecting themselves” (Wald (1984, p. 197)). These 
spacetimes represent nomological possibilities in which there is genuine 
backwards causation but no violation of irreflexivity. This is because the 
involved causal paths do not completely loop back onto themselves thereby 
creating CCCs or CTCs, though the relevant causal structure does allow for past 
influence. 
 
 The reductionist will ask, is it not unscientific to reject as out of hand or impossible 
those spacetimes that incorporate CTCs on the basis of a non-scientific principle about 
causation’s formal properties? After all, there are solutions to the EFEs that feature such 
structure.   
Morris, Thorne, and Yurtsever (1988) (MTY) argued that it is nomologically 
possible that there are wormhole exploiting time machines. Although their study concerned 
not just general relativity but also quantum field theory, that fact will not rob my illustrative 
point of all power. So, set it to one side. The history of reactions to MTY is important for 
acquiring insight into how relativity scholars think about the laws of physics. That history 
is told well by Kip Thorne (1994, pp. 508-521), who notes how Joseph Polchinski objected 
to MTY’s claim that time travel through wormholes is not paradox-free by envisioning a 
scenario in which a billiard ball b enters a wormhole w1 at some time t, exits a suitably 
connected wormhole w2 at an earlier time t-3 in such a way that it prevents b from ever 
entering w1 by colliding with it. The situation is manifestly paradoxical. If b is prevented 
from ever entering w1, it cannot venture back in time so as to preclude itself from entering 
the w1, though b did enter w1. What was inferred from this scenario and from the nature of 
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CTCs and time travel in semi-classical contexts (i.e., contexts involving quantized or 
classical fields, and classical gravitation as in GTR) was that the laws of physics ought to 
be supplemented with self-consistency principles like the following, 
 
(Self-Consistency Principle (SCP)): If the universe is described by a local 
solution of the mathematical formalism of the physical laws, then that 
description is extendable in such a way that it can be a constituent “of a global 
solution one which is well defined throughout the (nonsingular regions of) 
classical spacetime.”67 
 
The SCP is a principle that qualifies the laws of physics. Something like it was 
introduced (by Friedman et. al. (1990)) to help ensure non-paradoxical evolutions, though 
those evolutions may very well be consistent with solutions to the formalism of the 
underlying physical laws. Thus, it seems that SCP’s modal strength should at least be as 
strong as that of nomological necessity so as to help ensure that the laws of the theory that 
we use to correctly judge some evolution as nomologically possible or impossible do not 
let in paradoxes. And although John Earman does not think much of time travel paradoxes, 
he (1995, p. 161, pp. 176-177) argues that consistency constraints ought to be understood 
as bona fide laws of nature, and that physical possibilities are those possibilities consistent 
with what are ordinarily considered laws of physics plus consistency principles.68 
I conclude then, that it is not at all unscientific to introduce a nomologically 
necessary ancillary principle that restricts the space of nomological possibilities to those 
that are also metaphysically and/or logically possible. Notice that my case for this 
conclusion remains cogent even if the supposed paradoxes can be resolved.69 My conclusion 
here is that there is nothing unscientific about the strategy, and my justification is that 
physicists and very scientifically informed philosophers of physics have employed just 
such a strategy in scientific and philosophical practice.  
The question remains.  In general relativity, does one encounter paradoxes or 
impossibilities if one allows for CCCs and CTCs? Since I’m arguing that one should 
motivate principles that preclude CTCs by appeal to paradoxes implied by them, it will be 
important to articulate an actual paradox. So here it is. 
My articulation of the paradox will assume that at any world at which there exist 
entities that evolve in accordance with the laws of general relativity, causal eliminativism 
is false. But I also assume that causal reductionism is true, and that my use of the locution 
‘causeR’ picks out reductionist causation. Thus, my argument for the paradox begs no 
questions against causal reductionism. I will also need the posit that causation is transitive. 
 
(1) If GTR without constraining auxiliary principles is true, then it is physically 
possible that there are closed timelike curves that allow for causalR loops. 
 
                                               
67 Friedman (et. al.) (1990, p. 1915). 
68 Cf. Stephen Hawking (1992). 
69 Thus, one can endorse the conclusions and resolutions of time travel paradoxes in Earman, 
Smeenk, and Wüthrich (2009, pp. 93-100) and yet hold on to the supposition that the introduction of 
principles like SCP is not unscientific. 
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(2) If it is physically possible that there are closed timelike curves that allow for 
causalR loops, then an event can causeR itself. 
CTCs that allow for causalR loops, allow for a causalR chain that loops back onto 
itself. If an event A causesR B, and B causesR C, and C causesR A, by transitivity (which 
we are assuming), A will causeR itself. Thus, if there can be CTCs that allow for causalR 
loops, then an event (A) can causeR itself.  
  
(3) If an event can causeR itself, then any event can causeR itself. 
Many reductive theories will come out false if we allow for just a little self-causationR. 
However, among those that can tolerate self-causationR, perhaps by removing the ‘c is not 
identical to e’ clause in the analyses and/or theories, (3) will come out as a consequence. 
That is to say, if one’s reductive theory does not rule out reflexive causationR, then it will 
probably imply that every event causesR itself (which entails that any event can causeR 
itself). For example, consider a regularity account in the tradition of J.L. Mackie’s (1965)  
view,70 according to which c causes e if, and only if, c occurs, e occurs, and the proposition 
that <c occurs.> and the laws together with descriptions of the conditions surrounding c’s 
occurrence, entails the proposition <e occurs.> But obviously, that will be true in the case 
in which c is identical to e, since it will follow from <c occurs.> alone that <e occurs.>, if 
c is identical to e.  
 
(4) It is not the case that any event can causeR itself. 
I regard this premise as intuitively obvious. 
 
(5) Therefore, it is not physically possible that there are closed timelike curves that 
allow for causalR loops, and it is not the case that GTR without constraining 
auxiliary principles is true.71 
Thus, the proponent of C-GTR should not worry about CTCs. 
 
5.3. Back-Reaction and Causal Asymmetry 
 
John A. Wheeler remarked, “spacetime tells matter how to move; matter tells 
spacetime how to curve”.72 If GTR is interpreted causally, then Wheeler’s remark will 
recommend that the gravitational field’s behaving y-ly causes a material body to behave x-
ly, while the material body’s behaving x-ly causes the field to behave y-ly. But causation 
is formally asymmetric. We should therefore enforce a ban on instances of symmetric 
causation and so on causal GTR. 
The gravitational field’s dynamical action is primary and causally prior to the 
inertial motion of massive bodies. There are four reasons that constitute a cumulative case 
                                               
70 This is what Ned Hall (2004, p. 266) calls a “Mackie-style regularity account”. 
71 The same argument will run with minimal fundamentalist causation in mind. 
72 As quoted by Wheeler (1998, p. 235). 
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for such a thesis. (a) It is the gravitational field that can enjoy positive ontological status in 
the absence of matter, and not vice versa. 73  (b) It is the gravitational field that is 
fundamental to GTR and not the matter fields (q.v., note 47). (c) It is the gravitational field 
that can bring about an increase or decrease in the energy-momentum of massive bodies 
without itself having any localized energy-momentum density, and not conversely.74 And 
(d) it is the gravitational field’s direct coupling with matter fields that “results in the latter 
having an energy tensor”, and not contrariwise.75 The best explanation of facts (a)-(d) is 
that the primary causal mover in the context of the inertial motion of massive bodies is the 
gravitational field and not the matter fields of GTR. 
Dennis Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 469) would challenge my appropriation of (d) (and 
perhaps also the quotation of him for present purposes). 76  A dynamical and causal 
understanding of (d) is, for Lehmkuhl, incompatible with the fact that tensors of the energy-
momentum variety are defined in special relativistic contexts too. In STR, the metric hµn 
isn’t a dynamical entity.  
On the contrary, there are good reasons for understanding the geometric structure 
of Minkowski spacetime in STR as dynamical. That is to say, there are good reasons for 
regarding the geometry of Minkowski spacetime as an indispensable entity in explanations 
of both the forms of forces acting on objects (their Lorentz invariance), and the behavior 
of those objects.77 Indeed, Einstein went further by insisting that Minkowski spacetime 
acts.78  
But a proper response to Lehmkuhl need not go so far. We can instead invoke (non-
causal) grounding between facts. Causal facts reporting on the relevant obtaining causal 
relations are the base, the direct coupling facts (which themselves ground the definitional 
dependences) are the grounded entities.79 We need not believe that the grounds of an entity 
                                               
73 The gravitational field never vanishes even under coordinate transformations, and even in the 
absence of matter. Moreover, gravitational radiation can propagate in a vacuum. 
74 See Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, pp. 466-468); Rueger (1998, p. 34).  
75  Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 469). Lehmkuhl is explicitly concerned there with the Lagrangian 
formulation, for which see Carroll (2004, pp. 159-165). 
76 Lehmkuhl does not deny that there is interaction between metric field and matter in GTR. He 
said that “…the matter fields and the metric field gµn are interacting in GR…” Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 469) 
emphasis in the original. 
77 See the argumentation in Balashov and Janssen (2003, pp. 339-342). Contra Brown (2005); 
Brown and Pooley (2006); and Craig (2001). 
78 Einstein said, 	
“That something real has to be conceived as the cause for the preference of an inertial 
system over a non-inertial system is a fact that physicists have only come to 
understand in recent years….Also, following the special theory of relativity, the ether 
[features of Minkowski spacetime geometry] was absolute, because its influence on 
inertia and light propagation was thought to be independent of physical influences 
of any kind…” As quoted and translated by Brown and Pooley (2006, p. 68). Einstein 
said this in 1924. 
 
Brown and Pooley would go on to remark that “[i]t was Einstein’s view, then, both that the inertial property 
of matter can be explained, and that this explanation is to be given in terms of the action of a real entity on 
the particles”. Brown and Pooley (2006, p. 68) 
79 Continuing to use the theory in Schaffer’s (2009).  
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are essential to it. Thus, the metaphysical explanation of definitional dependence of energy-
momentum tensor on metric field is, by transitivity, grounded in the fact that the 
gravitational field causally interacts with the relevant matter fields. At purely STR-worlds, 
some other ground exists (e.g., conformal features of Minkowski spacetime) for the direct 
coupling and definitional dependency facts.  
Why invoke causation if the direct coupling relations are enough to ground 
definitional dependency between metric and energy-momentum tensor? The reason lies in 
what direct coupling amounts to in Lagrangian theories. We say that two (quoting 
Lehmkuhl) “fields…directly couple if they are factors of the same product term in the 
Lagrangian, which then gives coupled differential equations as field equations via the 
Euler–Lagrange equations”. 80  The condition for coupling is couched in terms of a 
mathematical fact. A Lagrangian is a scalar quantity. Product terms and factors are 
mathematical entities. What do such mathematical facts suggest about the world? Here I 
believe is where the causal interaction of the fields has some indispensable grounding role 
to play.81 Interestingly, the metaphysical explanation of the direct coupling facts enters the 
interpretation of those facts. Thus, if we impugn attributing action to Minkowski spacetime, 
we can still interpret the Lagrangian formulation of GTR causally, and hold on to fact (d) 
in the above inference to the best explanation argument. 
5.4. Causal GTR Presupposes Substantivalism 
 
One might judge that my argumentation essentially requires the truth of spacetime 
substantivalism.82  I do not think such a position is an essential presupposition of my 
argumentation, but even if it were, I would not be worried, for substantivalism is the default 
position in the context of GTR.83 Still, spacetime relationalism will not provide an escape 
from my reasoning. Instead of reducing the gravitational field to spacetime structure 
thereby attributing dynamical activity to spacetime itself, one could do without an 
ontological commitment to spacetime understood as an independent substance and treat the 
metric or gravitational field like a matter field and (perhaps) account for all of the empirical 
success ordinarily associated with a more orthodox GTR.84 I have already mentioned this 
option in the context of discussing the work of Brown (2005), (2009) and Rovelli (1997) 
                                               
80 Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 467) emphasis in the original. 
81 It is important to point out that Lehmkuhl believes that the causal interaction of fields is a 
sufficient condition for direct coupling (see Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 469)). He too sees room for a relationship 
between interaction and coupling. 
82 I am assuming that substantivalism is the view that spacetime exists as a substance (quoting Sklar) 
“independently of the existence of any ordinary material objects, where the latter phrase is taken to include 
even such extraordinary material objects as rays of light, physical fields…etc.” Sklar (1976, p. 161) 
On the basis of parsimony motivations, Brown (2005, pp. 24-25) argues against the view that 
spacetime structure plays an explanatory role in accounting for the motions of bodies.  Cf. the discussion in 
DiSalle (1994, p. 276); and DiSalle (1995, p. 327). 
83 See the comments in Arntzenius (2012, p. 17 “[a]ccording to…[GTR] spacetime, again, is a single 
four-dimensional entity.” (ibid.)); and Nerlich (2005, p. 281). In general, a realist approach to our most 
successful theories of physics suggests spacetime substantivalism (see the comments in Pooley (2013, p. 
539); and Sklar (1976, p. 214); cf. Weinstein (2001) who argues that relationalism is tough to defend in the 
context of quantum physics.) 
84 I do have reservations about such an interpretation. 
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at the end of section 1. These two scholars regard the metric or gravitational field as a field 
akin in nature to matter fields like the electromagnetic field. Belief in the causal action of 
a matter-like metric or gravitational field does not necessarily commit one to spacetime 
substantivalism as I have defined it. While Rovelli (2004, p. 78) maintains that the debate 
between substantivalists and relationalists in the context of GTR is a matter of 
“semantics” 85 , I believe there remains a substantial dispute. Does there exist an 
independent substance that is spacetime itself? Does the gravitational field reduce to 
spacetime geometry? It seems to me that both Brown (2005, p. 156) and Rovelli (2004, p. 
77) answer “no” to both questions. For them, there is just the gravitational or metric field, 
and my point here is that their position is at least consistent with relationalism. Ergo, 
substantivalism is no essential presupposition of my reasoning. 
In point of fact, the matter field approach to gravitation only strengthens the case 
for the causal interpretation of GTR. The gravitational field can come to possess ripples 
understood as gravitational waves or gravitational radiation. Gravitational waves 
propagate, and they are similar to electromagnetic waves in that they exhibit similar causal 
behavior. Rovelli illustrates the point, 
 
A strong burst of gravitational waves could come from the sky and knock down 
the rock of Gibraltar, precisely as a strong burst of electromagnetic radiation 
could. Why is the…[second] ‘matter’ and the…[first] ‘space’? Why should we 
regard the…[first] burst as ontologically different from the second? Clearly the 
distinction can now be seen as ill-founded.86 
 
We can therefore avoid having to commit to spacetime substantivalism and actually bolster 
the case for causal GTR if we appropriate one of the best relationalist-friendly approaches 
to the metric field or gravitational field in general relativistic contexts. 
 An anonymous referee with Erkenntnis provided me with the following objection. 
Suppose the Brown-Rovelli matter-like field approach to the gravitational field is wrong, 
and that the geometric interpretation is right. The following worries ensue, 
 
(W-A): It is false that most affirm both (i) a causal interpretation of the 
gravitational field’s action upon matter and (ii) a geometric interpretation 
of the gravitational field (i.e., the thesis that the gravitational field reduces 
to spacetime curvature). 
                                               
85 Although later in Rovelli (2004), he seems to think of his choice position as relationalist. He said, 
“Thus, both GR and QM are characterized by a form of relationalism.” (ibid., p. 220) 
86 Rovelli (1997, p. 193). Weyl compared the gravitational field’s action to the productive (causal) 
behavior of the electric field. He said,  
 
“…just as the electric field, for its part, depends on the charges and is instrumental in 
producing a mechanical interaction between the charges, so we must assume here that 
the metrical field…is related to the material content filling the world.” Weyl 
(1952, p. 220) emphasis in the original 
 
In his ontology of physics, Weyl made room for a guidance field that appears to be causal (see Coleman and 




Worry (W-A) is unsurprising because,  
 
(W-B): The geometric interpretation of the gravitational field implies that 
gravitation is not an interaction, and therefore not causal.87 
 
If W-B holds, then the argument from interaction in sect. 3 will fail, and my primary 
motivation for C-GTR will be defeated. 
 In response to W-A, I remind the reader that I have already provided reasons for 
believing that both the geometric approach to the gravitational field, and the causal 
interpretation of GTR are majority views among relativity scholars. It would therefore be 
surprising if there weren’t significant overlap, such that a great many proponents of the 
geometric approach also affirm a causal interpretation of gravitational action. Second, 
when one looks to specific relativists who affirm the geometric interpretation, one finds in 
that same work, again and again, a causal interpretation of GTR and the admission that 
gravitation is an interaction (see Dodelson (2017, pp. xi-1); Geroch (1978) “[t]he effect of 
curvature on matter in relativity, via Einstein’s equation, is regarded as fundamental by 
itself.” (ibid., 180); for Einstein, again see Pais (1982, p. 465); Einstein and Infeld (1938, 
pp. 226-235); Hartle (2003, p. 3-4 calling gravitation an interaction on page 3 and then 
stating on p. 4 that “[g]ravity is geometry.” p. 125; Hawking (1996, p. 5); Hawking and 
Ellis (1973, pp. 1-2, 71); Malament (2012a, p. 121 n. 5, p. 122 n. 6 (approvingly quoting 
Weyl’s causal interpretation), p. 143, p. 146-147, cf. p. 289; Wald (1984, p. 8, p. 71, p. 88; 
cf. the comments in Pooley (2013, p. 541)). Citations could be easily multiplied. 
 Worry (W-B) is mistaken. Events are causally efficacious types of entities. I’ve 
been working with the view that events are contingent states of substances. It is natural to 
assume on the geometric approach (though this assumption is not essential to the thesis of 
the current project) that spacetime is in fact a substance, and that it can have certain 
properties associated with certain of its regions. These property exemplifications have to 
do with spacetime’s geometry, its curvature, and are bona fide events (spacetime’s being a 
certain way). As such they can and (I have argued) do stand in causal relations. Moreover, 
it is not as if, on the geometric approach, spacetime curvature fails to influence the rates of 
clocks, deflect light, constitute ripples that propagate at the speed of light and influence 
entire galaxies and/or knock down mountains, etc. I’m afraid I do not see any reason why 
we should abandon the thesis that gravitation ceases to be an interaction on the geometric 
interpretation of the gravitational field. 
                                               
87 The idea that the geometric interpretation precludes a causal understanding of gravitational effects 
is expressed in many places, but see Livanios (2008, 390) who writes, “…[i]t is clear that if we adopt a 4-
dimensional ontological framework,…and geometrise away the gravitational field, spacetime does not 
causally affect matter.” 
I find it interesting that in one of the most exhaustive and most recent discussions of non-causal 
explanations in science and mathematics (explanations from constraint in Lange (2017)), the section on 
geometric non-causal explanation (see specifically ibid., 126-128) does not take up these matters having to 
do with geodesic motion and the gravitational field. Even if it did, Lange’s treatise seems most chiefly 
concerned with explanation. I’m interested in the ontology, what reality needs to be like to back explanations. 
I happen to think that obtaining causal relations can back non-causal (as well as causal) explanations. In fact, 
I think certain mathematical truths hold because (this is a because without cause that is indicative of a 
distinctive non-causal metaphysical explanation such as truth-making or grounding) certain causal relations 
obtain. Is this not suggested by causally interpreting mathematical formalism? 
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5.5. The Causal Talk is Gloss 
 
The reductionist may suggest that all of the causal talk I’ve referenced can be 
removed without loss of explanatory power. Explicitly causal interpretations of all of the 
above are therefore problematic. I reply that: Domains of causal influence help determine 
the global causal structure of spacetime. Without such causal structure one cannot derive 
the spacetime singularity theorems that are necessary for describing and explaining features 
of the beginning of the universe (see Wald (1984, p. 188; pp. 237-242) who calls such 
domains or causal structure a “crucial ingredient” in the proofs of the singularity theorems 
(ibid., p. 188)). 
Perhaps the reason why a reductionist would insist that the causal talk of physicists 
in general relativistic contexts is gloss is because one can provide a local reduction of 
causation and causal structure in cosmology and GTR. After all, the problems with many 
reductive accounts of causation rely on very unique and artificial cases of preemption, 
overdetermination and the like. Do such cases arise in GTR? The reductionist will bet that 
they do not. Thus, counterfactual dependence (or some similar reductive surrogate notion) 
may serve as a worthy proxy for general relativistic causation and causal structure even if 
it cannot serve as a worthy proxy for causation wherever it is found in the actual world or 
in broadly logical space.  
Local reduction strategies will not work. One can, on paper or with the mind’s eye, 
craft general relativistic worlds at which cases of overdetermination, preemption, and the 
like occur though these cases involve matter fields and the gravitational field, or 
gravitational waves, or certain tidal forces. It is particularly easy to get such cases because 
our world is a general relativistic world. Drop two rocks that are virtually identical at the 
same time from the exact same height on earth over a rectangular sheet of glass placed just 
one meter off the ground, and set up the glass in such a way that one of its longest and 
widest sides is parallel to the ground. If the rocks are dropped high enough, and if the glass 
is thin enough, each rock will, in a way involving causal overdetermination, bring about 
the shattering of the glass (hold fixed what you need to in the imagined case). The example 
involves the gravitational field induced by the earth, and the appropriate matter fields. The 
example is general relativistic in that it is said to be actual, and the case is one of symmetric 
overdetermination. This is the same brand of overdetermination that I claimed (in sect. 0) 
was problematic for counterfactual dependence theories of causation. Thus, general 
relativistic nomological possibilities and actualities recommend an incompatibility 
between the local reductive theory of causal structure and GTR itself. A fortiori, the 
problems with reductive theories of causation are not all revealed in counter-examples or 
difficult cases. There are many other problems with reductive accounts.88 
Still causal reductionists will insist that my appeals to GTR and cosmology are 
cheap and shallow. They will urge that the authorities I have invoked are merely describing 
matters with a particular gloss. Replace the occurrence of the term ‘cause’ or ‘causal’ with 
some other notion, and all will be well for the argument from physics. But what notion do 
we replace it with? The phenomenon described is interactive, the relation that obtains 
between matter fields and gravitational field is one of asymmetric influence (as argued in 
sect. 5.3) that is present when gravitational waves knock down a mountain (to repeat 
                                               
88 See Tooley (2003); and Rueger’s (1998) discussion.	
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Rovelli’s illustrative example from sect. 5.4). The goings-on described are causal by even 
reductionists lights (as argued in sect. 3.2.1). It seems therefore safe to conclude that in the 
absence of a truly successful reductive analysis or theory of causation, we have no reason 
to dispense with causal notions in the primitive ideology of GTR. 
 
6. Concluding Musings 
 
  I would like to be clear about something I have not done in this paper. I have not 
argued that causal fundamentalism is true. All of my objections to the argument from 
physics can be successful and yet causal fundamentalism come out false. One could also 
be agnostic about the entire debate in question. What I have done is argue that one 
important and often-traveled path to causal reductionism fails to secure adequate inferential 
epistemic justification. Such failure is evidence for causal fundamentalism in an important 
though ultimately inconclusive sense. My arguments are therefore one important first step 
in a more cumulative case for causal fundamentalism. 
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